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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 The  ECB  has  been  slower  to  cut  interest  rates  and  to  consider  asset  purchase 
programmes than the other major central banks even though the euro area economy 
has performed worse than its comparators. 
 This failure to act has not stemmed directly from the ECB’s price stability mandate. 
Indeed,  by  not  acting  sufficiently  strongly,  the  ECB  is  now  failing  to  meet  its  own 
definition of price stability. 
 The measures introduced at the ECB’s June Governing Council meeting will have only a 
modest positive effect on the euro area economy. 
 The negative deposit rate will have a small effect in reducing money market rates and 
yields on low-risk sovereign bonds but will do little to boost bank lending. Indeed, it 
may have a slight negative effect as banks raise interest rates on loans to offset the 
negative effect of the ECB charging them for their deposits. 
 The Targeted LTRO is not particularly well targeted and many banks will treat it as an 
unconditional two-year LTRO. 
 While  some  banks  will  consider  using  TLTRO  funds  to  provide  loans  to  the  private 
sector,  this  programme  will  do  little  to  counter  strong  pressures  on  banks  to 
deleverage and to establish stable private funding sources.
 Large asset purchase programmes – of both sovereign bonds and private asset-backed 
securities – are overdue. 
 The ECB should not wait until all of the regulatory issues with SME-loan-backed bonds 
are resolved and a large market for these instruments established. It should announce 
a programme of ABS purchases as soon as possible. 
 An programme of sovereign bond purchases would also reduce long-term interest rates 
and  send  an  important  signal  to  the  public  that  the  ECB  intends  to  meet  its  price 
stability target.  Such a programme would not violate the Treaty’s monetary financing 
clause.The ECB and Non-Standard Policies: Too little too late?
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1. INTRODUCTION
The  period  since the  beginning  of  the  global  financial  crisis  in  2008  has  been  an 
extraordinary one for central banks around the world. Short-term interest rates have been 
brought to historic lows and central banks have introduced a wide range of new operations 
that would have considered almost science fiction little more than a decade ago. Traditional 
methods for providing central bank liquidity have been overhauled and central banks such 
as the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have undertaken significant large-scale 
asset purchases (LSAPs) and as well as a range of special programmes targeted at specific 
sub-sectors of the financial system.
The  ECB  has  played  some  role  in  this  global  movement  away  from  traditional  central 
banking but its embrace of so-called “non-traditional” monetary policies has been slower 
and less enthusiastic. Like other central banks, the ECB responded to the crisis in 2008 by 
providing  large  amounts  of  liquidity  to  the  banking  system  and  simplifying  its  rules  by 
moving  towards  full-allotment  fixed  rate  operations.  Indeed,  the  ECB’s  existing 
comprehensive collateral framework meant that it was better positioned than some of the 
other large central banks to respond to the initial phases of the global crisis.
Since 2008, however, the ECB has been consistently slower to respond to the weakness in 
the  economy  and  the  financial  system  than  either  the  Federal  Reserve  or  the  Bank  of 
England. While these central banks quickly cut interest rates to near zero, it has taken the 
ECB almost six years to do this with this period including a mistaken tightening of policy in 
2011.   U nlike  the  Bank  of  England  or  Federal  Reserve,  the  ECB  has  not  undertaken 
significant  LSAPs  – its  asset  purchase  programmes  were  limited  to  small  purchases  of 
covered  bonds  and  the  SMP  programme  of  reluctant  and  temporary  sovereign  bond 
purchases.   W here  the  Bank  of  England  and  the  Fed  have  experimented  with  new 
approaches to “forward guidance”, the ECB has limited itself to bland (and probably impact-
free) assurances that current monetary policies will be in place for some time to come.
With the ECB now acknowledging that it has effectively run out of room for further rate 
cuts, the debate about which “non-standard policies” it should adopt has intensified and the 
June Governing Council meeting saw some new measures introduced.  This paper discusses 
the  new measures  introduced  by the ECM.   I t  also  argues the case for  asset  purchase 
programmes and discusses a number of specific issues that complicate their application in 
the euro area.
This structure for this paper is as follows.  Section 2 makes the case that the ECB has not 
reacted strongly enough to the economic weakness in the euro area and that, rather than 
just considering them now, it should have already introduced large-scale asset purchase 
programme.  Section 3 then discusses the actions taken by the ECB Governing Council in 
June – most importantly, a new targeted long-term refinancing operations (TLTRO) and a 
negative deposit rate – and argues that these decisions TLRTO will have a limited impact.
Finally,  Section  4  focuses  on  two  types  of  programmes  that  could  be  introduced:  A 
programme of purchasing bonds backed by loans to small and medium-sized enterprises
and a sovereign bond purchase programme.  Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
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2. THE CASE FOR LARGE-SCALE ASSET PURCHASES
This section outlines the rationale for LSAPs by a central bank, compares the actions since 
2008 of the Federal Reserve with those of the ECB and then argues that the ECB is failing 
to meet its mandate by its failure to pursue effective LSAP programmes.
2.1. Why Employ LSAPs?
In normal recessions, central banks respond to economic weakness by cutting the short-
term interest rates that they control.  These cuts end up being passed through to the rates 
that private sector firms and  households  can borrow  at. In a low inflation  environment, 
however, nominal interest rates tend to be relatively low on average and a severe recession 
may lead the central bank to cut interest rates to zero.  
Once  interest  rates  have  been  cut  to  zero,  the  central  bank’s  traditional  transmission 
mechanism for monetary policy is exhausted. This is not because the central bank cannot 
set  a  negative  interest  rate:  It  is  perfectly  possible,  for  example,  for  the  ECB  to  offer 
negative interest rate loans to banks i.e. to loan money and then allow the borrowing bank 
to return less than the amount borrowed.  However, under normal circumstances, it will not 
be possible to get private sector financial institutions to provide loans with negative interest 
rates – they would be better off simply to keep the money as cash in the bank (or under a 
mattress) than making loans of this type.
In addition to cutting interest rates to zero, central banks can also communicate to the 
public their intention to keep these rates very low for a long time – this will tend to reduce 
longer-term interest rates which  are heavily determined by the expected future path  of 
short-term rates.  
Beyond this  kind  of “forward  guidance”,  central  banks  can  choose  to  influence  private 
sector  interest  rates  by intervening  directly  in  financial  markets.  By  purchasing  large 
quantities of securities, central banks can raise their price, which reduces their yield.  These
reductions in yield may then be passed on to other key interest rates in the economy.
This  latter  point  about  LSAPs,  or  “quantitative  easing”  as  it  is  sometimes  known,  is 
important.   M ost of  the  commentary  about  these  programmes  characterises them  as 
“printing money” and it is often suggested that  their purpose is to expand the broader 
money supply and thus increase the availability of credit in the economy.  However, this is 
not how either the Federal Reserve or Bank of England have viewed these programmes.  
While the textbook “money multiplier” model describes how increases in the monetary base 
are automatically translated into increases in the broader money supply, this model does 
not provide an accurate description of money creation in a modern economy in which banks 
make  decisions  about  credit  creation  based  on  a  wide  range  of  macroeconomic  and 
regulatory factors.
1  
Instead of focusing on the idea that these programmes boost the broader money supply, 
research from the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England such as D’Amico at el (2012) 
and Joyce et al (2010) has clearly highlighted the reduction of bond yields as the objective 
of LSAPs. In particular, these studies have emphasised that they view the main purpose of 
LSAPs as being the reduction of “term premia”, i.e. that part of long-term interest rates 
that is unrelated to expected future short-term rates.  In other words, while LSAPs may 
                                                       
1 The recent paper McLeay, Radia and Thomas (2014) is effectively an official explanation of this viewpoint by the 
Bank of England.The ECB and Non-Standard Policies: Too little too late?
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play a role in providing forward guidance on future short-term rates, this is not seen as the 
principal channel through which they operate.
There  is  a  growing  empirical  literature  on  the  impact  of  LSAPs  on  bond  yields.   T he 
message from these studies is somewhat mixed: LSAPs work to reduce bond yields but the 
effects  are  relatively  limited  and  obtaining  these  limited  effects  requires  a  very  large 
amount of money creation.  For example, D’Amico et al (2012) state their results as follows
For  longer-term  Treasury  securities,  the  first  LSAP  program  (undertaken  in  2009) 
consisted of $300 billion of Federal Reserve purchases, while the second program (in 
late  2010  to mid-2011)  consisted  of  $600  billion  of  purchases.  Our  preferred 
estimates suggest that,  taking scarcity and  duration together, the first program of 
LSAPs  reduced  longer-term  Treasury  yields  by  about  35  basis  points;  the  second 
program,  larger  in  dollar  amount  but  smaller  in  its  impact  on  duration,  reduced 
longer-term Treasury yields by about 45 basis points.
So while LSAPs do work, they are a poor substitute for the ability to cut short-term interest 
rates  by  another  couple  of  percentage  points.   T his  illustrates  one  of the  downsides  of 
operating in a low inflation environment.
2.2. Comparison of the ECB and Federal Reserve
When compared with the actions taken by other central banks, the remarkable thing about 
the ECB’s current situation is that it has taken so long (and things have had to get so bad) 
for it to cut its policy rates towards zero and to consider asset purchase programmes.  
The graphs over the next few pages compare aspects of the euro area and United States 
economies over the past few years. They illustrate categorically that the ECB’s weaker and 
slower  response  over  the  past  few  years  has  occurred  despite  the  euro  area  economy 
performing far worse than the U.S. economy.
Figure 1 compares real GDP in the euro area and the United States, indexing both series to 
100 at their 2008 peak values.  Despite a widespread perception that the 2008 recession 
was driven by the events in the United States, the decline in GDP was larger in the euro 
area with GDP falling about 6 percent, compared with a decline of about 4 percent in the 
United States.  
The euro area has continued to underperform the United States in the years following the 
severe global contraction.  Despite widespread dissatisfaction in the U.S. with a relatively 
slow pace of growth, the U.S. economy has grown steadily since the middle of 2009 and 
real GDP in the first quarter of this year was 6 percent above its previous peak in 2008.  In 
contrast, the euro area economy began a sluggish recovery in 2009 which petered out in 
2011 as the economy entered back into recession (see Figure 1). While four quarters of 
very slow growth have now been recorded, euro area real GDP in the first quarter of this 
year remained 2.5 percent below its pre-crisis peak.
The euro area’s experience with unemployment has also been more negative than that of 
the United States.  The initial increase in unemployment in 2008/9 was larger in the U.S., 
with its unemployment rate rising from well below the European level to matching the euro 
area rate in late 2009.  However, from that point onwards the U.S. unemployment rate
gradually eased to reach 6.3 percent in May 2014.  In contrast, unemployment in the euro 
area rose in 2008 and 2009, plateaued in 2010, and then began increasing again during the 
second recessionary dip.  At 11.7 percent, the current unemployment rate in the euro area 
is  still  two-thirds  higher  than  it  was  prior  the  global  economic  crisis  (see  Figure  2).Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
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Figure 1: Real GDP in Euro Area and the United States
Indexed to 100 at 2008 Peak
Source: ECB SDW and Federal Reserve FRED Database
Figure 2: Unemployment Rates in Euro Area and the United States
Source: ECB SDW and Federal Reserve FRED DatabaseThe ECB and Non-Standard Policies: Too little too late?
PE 518.783 9
Despite this significantly  inferior  economic  performance,  the  ECB  has  been  consistently 
more reticent to use its powers to promote economic activity.  The ECB raised interest 
rates in July 2008 at a time when (we now know) the euro area economy was in recession. 
The ECB was then slower to cut interest rates than the Fed. While the Fed had cut its policy 
rate to effectively zero by the end of 2008, the ECB only gradually cut rates to one percent 
in May 2009.  The ECB then raised rates in Spring and Summer of 2011, just as the euro 
crisis  was  intensifying  and  leading  the  euro  area  back  into  recession.  Only  at  its  most 
recent meeting has the ECB finally reached the point where its key policy rate is close to 
zero.
The ECB’s approach to expanding its balance sheet has also been far more conservative.
There have been two types of bond-purchasing programmes but both were relatively small 
and are now over: A limited set of covered bond purchases and the mysterious and opaque 
stop-start bond purchases associated with the now-defunct Securities Market Programme. 
The ECB did provide additional liquidity to the European banking system after 2008 and its 
balance sheet had more than doubled after the second large LTRO in early 2012. However, 
from then until the most recent Governing Council meeting, there were no new initiatives to 
actively use the ECB’s balance sheet and it has now shrunk in size by about €1 trillion due 
to banks repaying their LTRO borrowings.  Figure 4 illustrates the ECB’s lack of use of its 
balance sheet relative to the Federal Reserve, which has expanded its assets by a factor of 
almost five.
2.3. The ECB: Meeting or Failing to Meets Mandate
One argument for the less active approach is that the ECB differs from the Federal Reserve 
in having a primary mandate for price stability and this mandate has forced it to act in a 
more conservative manner. I disagree with this position for a number of reasons.
First, it should be noted that the Federal Reserve has performed well in meeting its inflation 
mandate despite pursuing policies such as LSAPs. Indeed, in the period since August 2008, 
average consumer price inflation has been almost identical in the euro area and the United 
States.
2 Nor  has  there  been  any  sign  that years  of  the stimulative  “non-standard”
monetary  policies  are  producing  any  delayed  impact  on  U.S.  price  inflation, which  has 
remained close to target over the past few years.  The idea that the ECB could not afford to 
risk programmes such as LSAPs because of their inflationary impact simply does not match 
the evidence.
Second, in the absence of more vigorous monetary policies, the ECB is actually failing to 
meet its own definition of price stability. The ECB’s current staff projections envisage HICP
inflation of 0.7 percent this year, 1.1 percent in 2015 and 1.4 percent in 2016. Following on 
from last year’s HICP inflation rate of 1.4 percent, this projection represents a significant 
cumulative shortfall from the price level path consistent with the ECB’s interpretation of its 
own mandate.
This shortfall is particularly dangerous given the current economic conditions in the euro 
area.  Many European  governments,  firms  and  households  are  struggling  with high  debt 
burdens and below-target inflation slows the process of adjusting these burdens downwards
via  nominal  wage  increases.  An  important  part  of  this process  is  the  recovery  of 
competitiveness in peripheral economies but a low average inflation rate for the euro area 
                                                       
2 CPI  inflation in the U.S. has averaged 1.65 percent while HICP inflation in the euro area has averaged 1.66 
percent.Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
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as a whole makes it difficult for these countries to improve their competitiveness without 
experiencing a deflationary cycle that exacerbates existing debt burdens.
Overall, I believe that the ECB is failing to meet its own mandate by acting too cautiously 
and that it bears an important element of responsibility for both the failure to meet its own 
inflation target and the poor state of the euro area economy.
In my opinion, these arguments suggest that a more radical approach to monetary policy, 
such as new LSAP programmes, is long overdue.  The ECB, however, does not agree.  In an 
important speech in April, Mario Draghi mentioned the conditions under which he believed 
the ECB should adopt various new approaches.
3 He noted that a “targeted LTRO or an ABS 
purchase programme” would be the appropriate if there was “a further impairment in the 
transmission of our stance, in particular via the bank lending channel”  and stated that “a 
worsening of the medium-term outlook for inflation … would warrant a more broad-based 
asset purchase programme.”
I am a bit puzzled by this approach to asset purchase programmes. 
First, given that the euro area economy is already in very poor shape and inflation is falling 
well  short  of  target,  it  is  unclear  why  it  is  that  the  ECB  needs  to  wait  for  a  further 
worsening medium-term outlook for inflation before introducing LSAPs.
Second, it is unclear why the ECB believes that this condition had not already been met.
The ECB itself admits that it anticipates undershooting its own price stability target for at 
least  four  successive  years.  This  constitutes an  unsatisfactory  medium-term  inflation 
outcome and I hope the ECB will accept this over the coming months.  For this reason, I 
would  anticipate  that  some  form  of  large  asset  purchase  programme  is  likely  to  be 
implemented before the end of this year.
                                                       
3 This  speech  “Monetary  policy  communication  in  turbulent  times”  can  be  found  at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2014/html/sp140424.en.htmlThe ECB and Non-Standard Policies: Too little too late?
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Figure 3: Policy Rates in Euro Area and the U.S.
Black Line is Main Refinancing Operation Rate and Blue Line is Fed Funds Rate
Source: ECB SDW and Federal Reserve FRED Database
Figure 4: Balance Sheet Expansions of ECB and Federal Reserve
Index: January 2008=100
Source: ECB SDW and Federal Reserve FRED DatabasePolicy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
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Figure 5: Consumer Price Inflation in Euro Area and the U.S.
Black Line is Euro Area HICP, Blue Line is US CPI
Source: ECB SDW and Federal Reserve FRED DatabaseThe ECB and Non-Standard Policies: Too little too late?
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3. THE ECB’S JUNE GOVERNING COUNCIL DECISIONS
Though it stopped short of adopting an asset purchase programme, the ECB announced a 
range of new monetary policy measures at its June meeting. In addition to cutting its Main 
Refinancing Operation rate by 10 basis points to 15 basis points, the ECB announced other 
measures including
 Lowering the “remuneration rate” on excess reserves and deposits held with the 
Eurosystem to a negative ten basis points, so that banks need to pay a charge to 
the ECB for such deposits.
 Ending the “fine-tuning operations” for sterilisation of SMP bond purchases.
 Announcing  that  three-month  long-term  refinancing  operations  (LTROs)  would 
continue on a fixed-rate full-allotment basis until December 2016.
The ECB also announced a new Targeted Long-Term Financing Operation (TLTRO). This is a 
relatively complex operation with the following features.
 It allows  banks  to  borrow  for  four  years  at  a  fixed  rate.  In  this  year’s  two 
operations that rate will be 25 basis points. 
 The amount that a bank can initially borrow from this operation is 7 percent of
their  loans  to  the  euro  area  non-financial  private  sector,  excluding  loans  to 
households for house purchase.  
 Subsequently,  from  March  2015  to  June  2016,  banks will  be  able  to  borrow 
additional amounts that can reach up to three times their net lending to the non-
financial  private  sector  (excluding  loans  for  house  purchase)  from April  2014 
onwards in excess of a specified benchmark. The benchmark will be an institution-
specific calculation based on each bank’s net lending in the year prior to April 2014.
While I would have preferred to have seen the announcement of large-scale asset purchase 
programmes, these measures will have a small positive impact on the euro area economy 
by  lowering  interest  rates  somewhat.   I  a m  less  optimistic  that  they  will  generate  a 
significant increase in bank lending to the real economy.
3.1. The Negative Deposit Rate
In relation to interest rates, the move to negative rates on the deposit facility will have 
some  effects  on  money  market  rates  and  on  higher-quality  government  bonds.  The 
interaction between monetary policy and money market rates has changed in recent years. 
Figure 6 illustrates the “corridor” system by which the ECB traditionally controlled euro area 
money market  rates.  Prior  to 2008, EONIA,  the  average  overnight  money  market  rate, 
generally  stayed  very  close  to  the  ECB’s  MRO  rate  and  fluctuations in  this  rate were 
bounded above by the marginal lending facility rate and below by the deposit rate.
In  recent  years,  however,  many  banks  that  are  perceived  as  higher-risk  have  been 
excluded from short-term unsecured money markets.  While these banks can borrow at the 
MRO rate, the traditional arbitrage relationship between this rate and the money market 
rate has effectively broken down.  Instead, money market borrowing has been limited to 
lower-risk  banks  and  the  low  rate  earned  on  these  loans  is  seen  as  an  alternative for 
lending banks to leaving the money at the ECB and earning the deposit facility rate.  Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
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Figure 6: EOINA and the ECB’s Interest Rates
Source: ECB SDW
For these reasons, EONIA has tracked the deposit facility rate rather than the MRO rate 
over the past few years.  The move to a negative deposit facility rate will thus move money 
market rates downwards, a pattern that can already be seen in the week since the negative 
rate was introduced on June 11.
The reduction in the deposit facility rate will also have a small impact in reducing the yield 
on low-risk sovereign bonds.   With  money market rates falling towards  zero and banks 
paying a fee for having deposits with the Eurosystem, the demand for holding these short-
duration low-risk sovereign bonds as an alternative investment will increase, thus driving 
down yields. 
The “hot potato” effect on asset yields – driven by a desire by banks to have liquid assets 
instead of deposits with the Eurosystem – will intensify somewhat because of the additional 
liquidity entered into the system by the Governing Council’s decision to stop sterilising its 
SMP purchases and also by the TLTROs in September and December of this year.  
This liquidity-boosting effect  may  be  temporary,  however,  because the  ECB’s  current 
operational policies mean that the supply of central bank liquidity is effectively demand-
driven: With full-allotment policies in place and banks allowed to repay LTRO borrowings, 
the total amount of liquidity in the system will  be determined by  the actions of private 
banks rather than the ECB.  I ndeed, once  the  two original  large LTROs  are  repaid  next 
year, it is not clear that TLTRO will actually boost liquidity to much above current levels.
One potential goal of the negative deposit rate is to increase the supply of bank credit.  
One theory is that the charge on Eurosystem deposits will encourage banks to make loans 
instead  of  having  deposits  at  the  central  bank.   I t  is  very  unlikely,  however,  this  this 
mechanism will do much to add to credit growth. European banks are focused on building 
up regulatory capital ratios and are still very cautious in their assessment of private sector 
credit risk. While the negative deposit rate may boost demand for liquid securities, it is 
unlikely to do much for the supply of loans to the private sector.
Indeed,  with  banks  focusing  on  raising  profit  margins,  it  is  possible  that  the  negative 
effects on banking system income of the charge  on deposits may end  up being passed The ECB and Non-Standard Policies: Too little too late?
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through in the form of slightly higher interest rates on loans. In this sense, the negative 
deposit rate could actually prove harmful to credit conditions for firms and households in 
the euro area.
3.2. The TLTRO
Unlike the negative deposit rate, the TLTRO is intended to act directly to raise the supply of 
bank credit to the private sector.  
The scheme offers a number of incentives to banks to borrow from the ECB and use the 
funds  to  lend  to  the  private  sector.   T he  cost  of  this  credit  is  very  cheap:  This  year’s 
TLTROs will have a fixed interest rate of 25 basis points and subsequent LTROs will have an 
interest rate that is only 10 basis points above the prevailing MRO rate.  In addition, the 
four-year maturity for these loans is helpful to banks that are concerned about satisfying 
regulations on net stable funding ratios: It is hard to make four-year loans to customers on 
the basis of short-term funding from the central bank.
Despite these positive  elements, I have a number of  doubts about  whether TLTROs  will 
have much impact on bank lending to the private sector.
First, despite the name, the “targeted” nature of the TLTROs is weak. There is no fine or 
punishment for banks that take TLTRO funds and then don’t satisfy the lending benchmark. 
Instead these banks just have to pay back the funds after two years.  In this sense, the 
TLTRO also operates like a regular LTRO with a two-year maturity.  For this reason, it is 
likely that some banks will use the TLTRO to run two-year carry trades in which cheap ECB 
funding is used to purchase sovereign bonds and other  securities.  T hat said,  even  this 
element  of  the  TLTRO  is  not  particularly  important  because  of  the  announcement  that 
three-month LTROs will  be continued unto  December 2016.  T he interest rate on these 
three-month LTROs is  currently 10 basis points  below the TLTRO  and  rolling  over  these 
loans may prove cheaper than the TLTRO over the next two years.
Second, the availability of cheap funding of this sort does not change the strong longer-
term incentives that European banks have to deleverage.  A bank that is concerned about 
the current ECB-led stress tests (and likely follow-up exercises over the next few years) is 
unlikely to aggressively expand its balance sheet simply because it can borrow cheaply for 
a few years from the ECB.  Compliance with Basle 3 and market-driven demands for higher 
capital  ratios  are  also  playing  an  important  role  in  restraining  credit  growth  as  is  the 
perception that risk in areas like SME lending remains very high. 
Third, while a four-year TLTRO may look like a good deal and may qualify as stable funding 
for regulatory purposes, it does not change the fact that many banks wish to minimise the 
amount of funding they get from the ECB. This is partly due to a “stigma” effect in which a 
bank is viewed as being in weak condition if it borrows a lot of money from the ECB. It is 
also due to the negative “encumbrance” effect that comes from having to pledge collateral 
to the ECB to obtain funding.  
Taking these points together, I expect the TLTRO to have a relatively modest effect on 
bank lending.Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
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4. POTENTIAL EURO-AREA LSAP PROGRAMMES
The ECB is not currently undertaking any asset purchase programmes. Here I discuss two 
different  possible  types  of  asset  purchase  programme,  one  that  the  ECB  is  openly 
considering (purchasing asset-backed securities) and one that it is not yet considering (a 
programme of sovereign bond purchases).
4.1. Asset-Backed Securities
The idea  that  the ECB  could use  asset purchases to  boost  bank  lending  via  purchasing 
asset-backed securities (ABS) has featured in European policy discussions for at least a few 
years now.  Indeed, the impact of the ECB purchases of ABS was discussed in a series of 
Monetary Dialogue papers written in June 2013.
The  economic  case  for  such  a  programme  is  strong.  Unlike  programmes  that  focus  on 
providing cheap funding, a sufficiently-large ABS purchase programme by the ECB could 
play  a  significant  role  in  promoting lending.  Banks  could make  money  (via  fees)  for 
originating  loans  to  SMEs  without  triggering  the  funding  or  capitalisation  concerns 
associated with expanding their balance sheets.
During 2013, the ECB admitted it was considering a programme of ABS purchases, with the 
securities backed by loans to SMEs.  It set up a task force with the European Investment 
Bank  (EIB)  to  examine  how  such  a  scheme  would  work.  At  the  June  2013  Governing 
Council press conference, Mario Draghi said
4
there is a task force working on this together with the European Investment Bank, 
and if they produce something, it will be collateralised, it will be guaranteed by other 
institutions.
In other words, any ABS purchases by the ECB would have to be guaranteed by the EIB.
When  I  considered  this  issue  in  my  June  2013 Monetary  Dialogue  paper,  I  was  pretty 
downbeat about the prospects of a successful programme emerging and wrote “I suspect 
the proposal for the ECB to purchase ABS will turn out to be a damp squib given the ECB’s 
lack of enthusiasm for asset purchases and a reluctance to use up much shared European 
public money to provide the required guarantees.”  
Unfortunately, this prediction turned out to be correct. The ECB-EIB task force appears to 
have ended in failure.  European Investment Bank President Werner Hoyer stated in April
5
It  is  the  EIB's  job  to  provide  financing  for  growth  and  jobs.  Offering  large-scale 
guarantees to revitalize the ABS market would not be in accordance with this
The ECB is again talking about ABS purchases but it is still in “preparation” mode.  The 
recent announcement stated
The Governing Council has decided to intensify preparatory work related to outright 
purchases  in  the  ABS  market  to  enhance  the  functioning  of  the  monetary  policy 
transmission mechanism, given the role of this market in facilitating new credit flows 
to the economy. Under this initiative, the Eurosystem will consider purchasing simple 
and transparent ABS with underlying assets consisting of claims against the euro area 
non-financial  private  sector,  taking  into  account  the  desirable  changes  in  the 
regulatory environment, and will work with other relevant institutions to that effect.
                                                       
4 See http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2013/html/is130606.en.html.
5 See https://mninews.marketnews.com/content/eib-hoyer-not-ready-large-scale-guarantees-abs-pressThe ECB and Non-Standard Policies: Too little too late?
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The “intensification of preparatory work” may seem like a positive development but I am 
still not optimistic that an ABS programme will emerge any time soon.  
While it appears that the ECB has perhaps given up looking for some other European public 
body to insure its ABS purchases (an unnecessary and time-wasting exercise) it seems to 
me that its new approach is to signal a willingness to purchase ABS backed by SME loans 
only when these instruments are designed and regulated in a way that produces a large 
and well-functioning market.  
This will not be a matter of amending a few small regulations. Even when issuance of ABS 
was at its peak prior to the financial crisis, SME-backed bonds accounted for only a very 
small percentage of these assets.  SME loans have a number of features that make them 
less  compatible  with  securitisation  than,  for  example,  household  mortgages.  SME  loans 
contain a large amount of idiosyncratic risk; a much larger fraction of the risk associated 
with  mortgage  loans  can  be  summarised  through  a  few  observable  household 
characteristics.  SME  loans  are  also  less  homogenous  in  their  terms  and  conditions, 
including  collateral  requirements  and  underlying  interest  rates.  With  small  firms  more 
vulnerable  to  economic  conditions  than  large  ones,  the  income  flows  underlying  these 
securities will generally feature more correlated risk than mortgage-backed securities.
A sense of the complexity of this issue can be seen from the range of issues covered in the 
ECB’s new joint paper on this topic with the Bank of England. The paper covers a very wide 
range of issues, including the need for a simple and transparent design for ABS, the need 
for credit register data and the role of the European Union in certifying and regulating these 
securities.
My sense is that two separate issues are being conflated here. The first issue is a longer-
term one of how to create a large and successful market for ABS in the European Union. 
This is a good policy objective but it is a complex and long-term project.  The second is 
whether the ECB can do something soon to boost bank lending to SMEs in the euro area.  I 
believe the ECB should act on the second issue before the first issue is resolved.
The ECB has now done a  large amount of preparatory work on  the kind of ABS that it 
wishes to see as a popular investment – ABS that are “simple, real, transparent” to quote 
Mario Draghi from the June Governing Council meeting. It would certainly be possible for 
the ECB to announce in the next few months that it is willing to purchase a set amount of 
ABS designed in specified fashion. 
An  announcement  of  this  sort  would  probably  help  to  develop  the  market  for  these 
instruments and the ECB may well be able to sell them on a later date once this market is 
more fully developed. However, for now, this should be seen as a secondary development. 
Again,  I’m  afraid  I  am  not  optimistic.  With  its  earnest  talk  of  the  need  for  various 
regulatory  changes,  the  ECB  has  given  itself  a  very  large fig-leaf  to  justify  continued 
inaction. 
4.2. Sovereign Bonds
Finally, the ECB could consider a much broader programme of asset purchases. In theory, 
such  a  programme  could  involve  corporate  bonds  and  equities.  However,  I  will  restrict 
myself here to discussing a potential programme of sovereign bond purchases.
We know a lot about how programmes of large-scale sovereign bond purchases work from 
the  experiences  of the  Federal  Reserve  and  Bank  of  England. This  provides  a  range  of 
empirical evidence to draw on to illustrate how such a programme would reduce long-term 
interest rates.  Inevitably, though, things are more complicated in the euro area and an Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
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LSAP programme of sovereign bond purchases would face a  series of issues relating to 
operational design as well as legal questions.
In terms of design, the most obvious type of programme would be one that purchases the 
same fraction of the public debt of each euro area member. However, such a design could 
lead to objections that it somehow incentives countries to have large amounts of debt. An 
alternative design would see the allocation of bonds purchased set according to some other 
indicator such as the country’s ECB capital key.
Based on evidence from the UK and US, a programme of this sort, focused on long-term 
bonds, could be expected to reduce long-term interest rates in all euro area countries. One 
complexity when comparing the euro area with the UK and US, however, is that the public 
debt of those countries is effectively priced free of default risk. In contrast, a number of 
euro area countries still have significant amounts of default risk priced into their public 
debt. These risk spreads may  well be more sensitive to demand factors that the “term 
premia”  through  which  LSAPs  have  worked  in  the  UK  and  US.  If  so,  the  impact  of  a 
sovereign bond LSAP in the euro area could be larger in countries such as Italy, Spain, 
Greece and Portugal. 
In my opinion, an LSAP programme of this type is overdue and will have a modest positive 
effect on the European economy. Perhaps even more important than its impact via lowering 
long-term interest rates would be its signal to  the public that  the ECB is serious about 
meeting its inflation target. This would help to raise inflation expectations and thus act to 
bring about the desired outcome.
One predictable aspect of an LSAP programme of sovereign bond purchases is that it will 
trigger  various  claims  that  it  is  illegal  under  the  European  Treaty’s  monetary  financing
clause. In truth, these arguments have long since been settled. If the SMP programme of 
secondary market purchases was legal, then a broader programme aimed at purchasing the 
bonds of all  euro  area member states should also be seen as legal.  Indeed, since this 
programme would apply to all states rather than simply a small number deemed to be in 
trouble, it is not be subject to a critique of providing “special treatment” to certain member 
states, a critique that lies at the heart of the recent German Constitutional Court objection 
to the OMT programme.
One issue raised in the German court judgment which is worth a few final words is the 
issue of pari passu or equal treatment of bond purchases. I believe this is an area where 
the ECB’s statements have added unnecessary confusion. When a central bank purchases a 
bond in an open market operation, the terms and condition of this bond give the central 
bank the exact same rights as any other purchaser of this bond. No special legal act needs 
to be passed to place the ECB on the same footing as other investors – this is simply how 
things are.  If, for example, a government passes a law changing the terms and conditions 
of its public debt, then this applies also to the debt owned by the ECB.
In practice, the ECB used its considerable power and influence to avoid taking any losses 
on its portfolio of Greek bonds (bought on the market at a low price due to the substantial 
default risk that was priced in). My reading of the so-called pari passu “feature” of the OMT 
is  not  that  this  is  a  special  legal  feature  of  OMT  purchases  but  that  it  was  an  implicit 
promise  from  the  ECB  to  avoid  behaving  a  “holdout”  investor  and  using  threatening 
behaviour to avoid taking losses.  If so, this is to be welcomed – private investors deserve 
to know they stand on an equal footing with all other purchases of a particular security. 
This implicit promise  should  also  apply to any potential future sovereign bond purchase 
programme.  
Time will tell if the ECB is actually willing to undertake such a programme.The ECB and Non-Standard Policies: Too little too late?
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